Cairo Magazine - The establishment's dissident

Osama Al Ghazali Harb has broken ranks with his colleagues in the National Democratic Party to oppose the constitutional amendment governing presidential elections, which he feels does not actually create a fair chance for opposition candidates.

Ahmed Hosni

In mid-May, an unusual thing happened in the normally-sleepy Shura Council, the upper chamber of parliament: a senior appointed Council member belonging to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) broke rank on the crucial issue of the day. Echoing the complaints of opposition parties and political movements like Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood, Osama Al Ghazali Harb voted against the text favored by the NDP for the amendment of constitutional Article 76. The text passed nonetheless, and was approved in a 25 May referendum.

A political scientist by training, Al Ghazali Harb has worked as a journalist and columnist since the 1970s and is currently editor-in-chief of Al Siyasa Al Dowliya. His articles appear regularly in Al Ahram. He sits on the boards of the National Council of Human Rights, Higher Press Council and National Council for Women, and is secretary-general of the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs. Perhaps most importantly, he was chosen by Gamal Mubarak to sit on the Higher Policies Council, the NDP’s most powerful body.

Yet while Al Ghazali Harb clearly belongs to the country’s political and intellectual establishment, his credentials deviate markedly from his colleagues’. He established the Al Nidaa association, a now-moribund liberal think tank, and is a member of the liberal New Civic Forum. His father was arrested in 1954 during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. Al Ghazali Harb himself was twice arrested for membership in the banned Egyptian Communist Party and flirted with joining the Muslim Brotherhood before becoming, successively, a nationalist and a liberal. Today he is part of the “new guard” of businessmen, politicians and intellectuals in the NDP, as contrasted with the “old guard,” which has its roots in the security services.

Al Ghazali Harb’s rejection of the proposed amendment was a surprise to many political observers. After President Hosni Mubarak announced in late February his plan to amend the constitution to allow for direct elections, Al Ghazali Harb was one of many who cheered the move. “The July Republic has exhausted its purpose,” he wrote in Al Ahram in early March, referring to the July 1952 Free Officers’ revolution that ousted the monarchy. “We are now in need of radical changes that will create a genuinely democratic second republic. President Mubarak is in an excellent position to lead this transformation, as he basically inherited the system and was not party to its founding.” The term “second republic,” an idea borrowed from France’s political history, became popular quickly after the article’s publication.

A few months later, with the press buzzing about Al Ghazali Harb’s dissent on the amendment to Article 76, weekly political tabloid Sawt Al Umma reported that his stance

had angered top NDP officials and probably cost him a top government job. According to rumors, he had previously been in line for the post of Al Ahram editor-in-chief, Ibrahim Nafie’s prestigious position.

His move met with praise, however, in the independent press. “Dr. Osama is the sole senator to speak overtly against the amendment,” wrote Al Masri Al Youm columnist Magdi Mehanna. “This is self-respecting. I am sure there are other members of the NDP who dare not take the same position with the same courage because of political calculations.”

Al Ghazali Harb’s colleagues at the Al Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, which publishes Al Siyasa Al Dowliya, interpreted the senator’s refusal as typical of his belief in the possibility of systemic change from within. “Dr. Osama’s position is morally positive. It proves the existence of healthy internal conflict, albeit rare, within the system. It gives an example of the possibility of having a position independent from that of the leadership. This is irrespective of the age [of political leaders] or whether they are ‘old guard’ or ‘new guard,’” said Amr Choubaki.

When Cairo met with him soon after his vote against the proposed amendment, Al Ghazali Harb occupied a crowded office. A television set on mute showed Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif on his visit to the United States and a raft of articles on political reform covered his desk. He pointed out a Washington Post editorial entitled “Egypt’s Fading Hope”—“Rather harsh, don’t you think?”—and explained why he thinks Egypt could be on the brink of a democratic transformation.

As a political scientist specializing in modern Egyptian political history, how do you read the present moment?

The present moment must be put in its proper historical framework. If one looks at the contemporary history of Egypt, we see two main periods. The first starts with independence, at least the theoretical one, in 1922. This was the initial ‘liberal phase.’

Under the 1923 constitution, which was fashioned after other liberal European constitutions of the time, Egypt was a constitutional monarchy. This translated itself into a multi-party system and political freedom, which paved the path for freedom of expression and of the press. This time proved to be a culturally, intellectually and artistically thriving era. It was during this period that all the stars of modern Egyptian enlightenment were around—Taha Hussein, Tawfiq Al Hakim, Abbas Al Aqaad, Moustafa Musharafa, Muhammed Abdel Wahab, Mahmoud Mukhtar, Nagib Al Rihani among many other exceptional intellectuals and politicians. This period also witnessed economic prosperity under Talaat Harb and a vibrant political climate for political parties, headed at that time by Al Wafd.

Nevertheless, the problems of that era—the conflict between the king, the British occupier and the political parties on the one hand and new pressures by the middle class and professionals (doctors, engineers and lawyers), bureaucrats and military officers on the other—contributed to its downfall. Add to this the international environment. Towards the end, this period saw the emergence of the Cold War, along with the US’ obsession with fighting communism in the region. From the US perspective, this required firm governments, whether or not they were democratic.

This course of events ushered in the 1952 revolution, which marked the inauguration of the second period in the modern history of the Egyptian political system, from 1952 until the present.

The main feature of this period was Gamal Abdel Nasser’s charismatic leadership, which was marked by monopoly of power and authoritarianism. Political parties were banned, rigid censorship was imposed on civil society and the mass media and press were nationalized. Since then, all political developments in Egypt were erected on this authoritarian foundation, save some half-hearted democratic changes. It is only in the light of the defeat of 1967 that we started to see how defective the system actually was.

After the death of Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al Sadat came and tried to found his legitimacy on democracy and the rule of law. After the 1973 war he moved towards a multi-party system and revised that matter in the constitution. When Mubarak came, he began by following with what Sadat had started. Among the reforms he carried out was giving more press freedom, as well as more rights to Copts and women. Nevertheless, the characteristics of an authoritarian regime continue to exist.

So do you believe that the present moment could be a true ‘critical moment’ for change under the existing regime?

As a matter of fact, what is happening now is more likely a prelude to comprehensive change. It might need some time to materialize. This is a move from an authoritarian republic towards a democratic republic or, as I call it, the “second republic.”

This is taking place under the effect of two forces. On the one hand, you have the internal demand for democracy by all political powers, which feel embittered because of the state of stagnation that has marked the Egyptian political reality in the last two decades.

On the other hand, this is happening in parallel with external pressures to democratize. After 9/11 the US learned the hard way that the absence of democracy invites an imminent threat to its national security, even the safety of its citizens on the ground at home.

As a result, when President Mubarak declared his intention to allow for a multi-candidate election, everyone imagined this to be the first spark to comprehensive change. This is a common narrative in history. With the social currents going in one direction, an event emerges in that direction and helps change to take place. This is the beginning of a long widening road to change, not a secondary or half-hearted change. But it is not going to be that easy either.

You say in your latest writings that not only will transformation to democracy be difficult, but also that its price will be high. Why?

We are facing the probability of true transformation. We are at the door of democratic change. But first, we should not underestimate what 50 years of undemocratic life and political stagnation has done. It has withered all political actors across the board. It is not surprising that the opposition parties are feeble and inactive. In Darwinian terms, the organ that is not used degenerates.

Second, under such a reality, naturally the strings of the political game are in the hands of actors who are associated with the conventional cultural roots of the society—in our case religion. It is like a rule of thumb: prolonging an authoritarian regime exhausts all political actors except Islamic forces.

Third, this phase of undemocratic rule has brought to the forefront a complex matrix of both individuals and institutions that are benefiting from the existing order of things. They want to maintain the status quo. Change is frightening this network, especially the parts of the political bureaucracy of the ruling party that are only used to playing “conventional politics.” All this suggests that democratization will not be easy.

As a member of the NDP’s Policy Secretariat, your rejection of the formula of the amendment to Article 76 has caused much controversy. What made you so vocal in expressing your rejection?

The amendment of Article 76 could have been a true beginning for the advance of democracy. It is no coincidence that such an initiative unexpectedly sparked a wave of demands and hopes. Look at how many forums, lectures and writings have emerged on this from all sides—whether parties, syndicates or civil society institutions. It is not just a matter of revising a single clause in the constitution—it has to do with the institution of the presidency, which is central to political life and can make any future change far easier.

Now, if we look into the amendments made to Article 76, what are the practical results? All independent political actors are denied any chance for participation. As for the party candidates, under the existing makeup of the People’s Assembly it is impossible to gather all the needed signatures. One would need a whole year just to gather the needed signatures from 14 different local councils! This is an absurdity. Also, I think that the condition which states that the party of the presidential candidate must be around for at least five years before the election is impractical. All around the world, political parties are formed a few months before elections. In addition, a candidate can run for a coalition of parties.

The modern history of Egypt shows that there has always been one dominant political power: there was Al Wafd, the Revolutionary Command Council and now the NDP. This makes the condition of having 5 percent of parliamentary seats next to impossible.

The amendment to Article 76 has caused a deep state of disappointment. That is why I felt that I had to express my absolute rejection out loud.

In your opinion, could the NDP be more responsive to change?

If the NDP continues to take the current course of action, then I do not believe that the NDP will be able to respond to new changes in the political theater in a satisfactory way.

You are considered one of the most prominent liberals in the “new guard” of the NDP. How do you see the condition of the liberal front in the current political landscape?

The liberal movement is in limbo. Democracy, freedom and liberty are some of the objectives that we are after and this necessitates the presence of liberalism. Still, the liberal front is in a state of relative weakness. Historically, the party which defended liberty was Al Wafd. There are many reasons for the deterioration of that party and its limited influence in the public space. Under the current situation, the leftist front has gained grounds because of the current socio-economic reality, which emphasizes socially-conscious activism.

I still believe that the liberal movement is picking up more and more momentum every day, particularly seeing how many political activists—whether Marxists or Islamists—are embracing liberalism. Liberalism is not an ideology in a strict sense; it is a political tendency that gives space for all to partake.

Under the current political situation, what do you think of the Kifaya movement?

I believe that Kifaya is a natural product of the current moment. It is a partnership calling for democratization. The political stage was ready to receive any player—other than the parties that are in slumber—to carry this task. The best thing about Kifaya is its sense of timing. It is a spontaneous, open and direct assembly of independent actors in addition to some leadership with a long history in the political field. It is a genuine movement whose existence shows the possibility for a healthy future. It should be encouraged as the best expression for non-religious activism in Egypt, at least to balance out the heavy presence of the Brotherhood. If I were in the NDP’s shoes, I would support Kifaya!